The virus knows no borders. Kazakhstan lost nearly 2 million birds during the 2020 H5N8 outbreak, yet six years later, weak surveillance along migratory routes remains one of Central Asia’s main vulnerabilities, DKNews.kz reports.
The threat was discussed on July 21 during an international technical webinar organized by the Regional Secretariat of the One Health Program in Central Asia. More than 50 experts in veterinary medicine, public health, ecology, vaccinology and laboratory diagnostics took part.
Millions of Birds Are Still Dying
Highly pathogenic avian influenza has spread far beyond poultry farms. The virus circulates among wild birds, infects domestic animals and occasionally crosses the species barrier.
In May 2026, authorities reported 51 outbreaks among poultry and another 32 among wild birds and mammals worldwide. Around 2.16 million birds died or were culled in a single month, according to the World Organisation for Animal Health.
The situation in wildlife is even more concerning. During the current epidemic season, detections among wild birds rose well above the previous two seasons, reaching 7,098 outbreaks.
Eliminating an outbreak at one farm therefore does not remove the wider threat. The virus can remain in nature and return with migratory birds.
Central Asia Lies on a Major Migration Route
The Central Asian Flyway connects South Asia, the Middle East and northern Eurasia. Millions of birds cross national borders every year without veterinary controls.
The virus spreads through biological secretions, contaminated water and infected prey. Raptors and scavengers can become infected after eating sick or dead birds.
Cranes, ducks, geese, gulls, terns, pelicans, herons, falcons, eagles and vultures are particularly susceptible. Mass deaths among these species may provide the first warning that the virus has reached a new area.
Wild-bird surveillance in Central Asia, however, does not cover the entire migration corridor. Without regular sampling and cross-border data exchange, the virus may reach a poultry farm before a laboratory receives its first specimen.
Kazakhstan Has Already Paid a High Price
During the 2020 H5N8 outbreak, Kazakhstan recorded 98 outbreaks across 11 regions. The country lost nearly 2 million birds.
The figures were presented by Professor Kaisar Tabynov, Director of the International Center for Vaccinology at the Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. After the crisis, Kazakhstan launched a large-scale vaccination program for the industrial poultry sector.
The virus did not disappear. According to data presented during the webinar, Kazakhstan’s most recent outbreak was recorded among swans in the Mangystau Region in December 2023.
By January 24, 2024, the number of dead birds had reached 1,179. Kazakh scientists isolated and genetically characterized an H5N1 virus belonging to clade 2.3.4.4b.
This clade has been driving a global panzootic since 2021, affecting animals across several continents. It infects not only birds but also a growing range of mammals.
Speed Matters More Than the Volume of Reports
The first report of dead birds does not mean the surveillance system has worked. Specialists must collect the sample correctly, transport it to a laboratory, confirm the virus and deliver the result to decision-makers.
Maral Chommadova, Regional Coordinator of the One Health Program at CAREC, identified the decisive measure of effectiveness.
“The effectiveness of epidemiological surveillance is determined not by the volume of data collected, but by how quickly that data is used to make decisions.”
Biosecurity remains the first line of defense on farms. Poultry must be isolated from wild birds, while access, vehicles, disinfection procedures and staff health require strict monitoring.
If these rules exist only on paper, vaccination will not protect a business. The virus can enter a farm through water, feed, footwear, equipment or transport.
“Vaccination should be regarded as part of a comprehensive prevention system, not as a substitute for it.”
One Transport Error Can Undermine Diagnosis
Isabella Monne, a researcher at Italy’s Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie, explained the laboratory chain. Specialists take tracheal and cloacal swabs from live birds and collect organ and tissue samples from dead birds.
Even properly collected material can become unusable during transport. A broken cold chain, incorrect labeling or inadequate packaging can reduce diagnostic quality.
Samples must be transported under the international UN3373 standard. A country’s preparedness therefore depends not only on its reference laboratory but also on the field specialist who first reaches the dead birds.
How Dangerous Is Bird Flu to Humans?
As of July 7, 2026, the World Health Organization had recorded 1,000 laboratory-confirmed human infections with A(H5N1) across 25 countries. Of these, 479 were fatal.
The figures demand attention, but not panic. The 1,000 cases accumulated over more than two decades, beginning in 2003, and most patients had contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments.
The 479 deaths should not be interpreted as the probability that any infected person will die. The statistics cover laboratory-confirmed cases, meaning severe patients may be disproportionately represented.
Experts have not detected sustained human-to-human transmission of H5N1. A joint FAO, WHO and WOAH assessment rates the risk to the general population as low, although poultry workers, veterinarians and people handling infected animals face greater exposure.
The main danger lies elsewhere. The more widely the virus circulates among birds and mammals, the more opportunities it has to acquire changes that could make human infection easier.
What to Do If You Find a Dead Bird
Never touch a bird carcass with bare hands. Do not take it home, feed it to animals or attempt to transport it to a laboratory yourself.
Report the discovery to the local veterinary authorities. Multiple dead waterbirds or raptors in one area should be treated as a serious warning signal.
Poultry meat and eggs must be thoroughly cooked. Raw products, contaminated surfaces and close contact with sick birds create a genuine route of exposure.
Vaccines Exist, but They Do Not Provide Complete Protection
Kazakhstan has registered several vaccines against influenza in humans, birds and horses. Scientists are also researching an intranasal nanovaccine against highly pathogenic avian influenza.
This scientific capacity gives the country an advantage, but developing a vaccine and protecting an entire industry are different tasks. A vaccine must match the circulating strain, while vaccinated flocks still require laboratory surveillance.
Poorly managed vaccination can conceal the circulation of infection. Birds may stop dying in large numbers while continuing to carry and spread the virus.
Immunization works only when combined with biosecurity, surveillance and rapid data exchange.
A Webinar Cannot Replace a Working Response System
All five Central Asian countries approved the regional One Health framework in 2023. The World Bank and the Pandemic Fund joined the initiative in 2025.
National coordination bodies, action plans and international meetings create a necessary foundation. But the number of conferences held does not measure preparedness for the next outbreak.
The real indicators are different: the time between finding a dead bird and receiving a laboratory result, the number of monitored wetlands, the readiness of field teams and the speed of notifying neighboring countries.
Central Asia needs a shared map of migration risks and compatible laboratory protocols. Otherwise, each country will see only the part of the outbreak inside its borders while the virus moves freely across the entire region.
